Using a novel data set of rental market listings, we find that homeownership rates are high where price-to-rent ratios are high but rental properties are scarce. We model the provision of owner-occupied versus rental housing services as a competitive search economy where households have private information over their expected duration. Owning is assumed inefficient but does solve the private information problem. With public information, households with low vacancy hazard rates pay lower rents and search in thicker markets. With private information, rentals are under-provided to long-duration households to discourage short-duration households from searching there. If households have high enough expected durations, rentals become scarce enough that they prefer to own. The data confirm that long-duration households sort into scarce rental markets, consistent with a private information problem.
Introduction
We use a large, novel dataset of rental and for sale listings from Craigslist to show that, within a market (such as a city), the parts of the market (i.e. "submarkets") where homeownership rates are high are also the parts where rentals are relatively cheap but scarce. In other words, households are more likely to search for owner-occupied housing not when the relative price of an equivalent rental is high, but rather when an equivalent rental is hard to find. The data also show that households that have relatively long expected durations in their homes tend to live in the submarkets where rentals are scarce. Crucially, the data allow us to measure scarcity by measuring how quickly vacant homes are filled and not just the supply of housing in a submarket. Figure 1 illustrates the basic stylized correlations between rent-to-price ratios, homeownership rates and rental vacancy rates using the Seattle Area. In the figures, each dot is a submarket, which we define as housing with a particular number of bedrooms in a particular zip code. Rentto-price ratios are the ratio of the mean rent to mean price in submarket (e.g. the mean over 2 bedroom listings in zip code 49820) using the Craigslist data (see below for complete description).
Homeownership rates are from the Census at the same bedroom x zip code level. Time on the market is the average number of days that a rental property is posted for rent in our Craigslist data. Verbrugge (2008) ; Verbrugge and Poole (2010) ; Bracke (2013) find similar positive correlations between price-to-rent ratios and homeownership rates; the latter even after controlling for potential unobserved heterogeneity. The figures also show that rental properties stay on the market longer in high price-to-rent ratio submarkets and in submarkets where homeownership is low.
Using a competitive search model, we show that when households' expected durations are public information, rentals are counterfactually scarce in submarkets where short duration households search. However when expected durations are private information, an adverse selection problem causes rental housing to be scarce in submarkets where long duration households search and endogenously leads to high homeownership rates among these households even though price-to-rent ratios in their submarkets are also high.
There is a long list of plausible frictions that may create meaningful differences in the value of owning versus renting a home to a household. Many of the frictions that favor renting, such as the higher transactions costs of buying and selling a house and the downpayment constraints in the mortgage market, appear in one form or another in nearly all life cycle models with a homeownership choice 1 .
However, there is little consensus on the frictions that favor owning. Tax wedges may offer one 1 e.g. Campbell and Cocco (2007) ; Chambers, Garriga and Schlagenhauf (2009a,b) ; Cocco (2005) ; Diaz and Luengo-Prado (2008) ; Fisher and Gervais (2007) ; Gervais (2002) ; Amior and Halket (2012) ; Iacoviello and Pavan (2009) ; Kiyotaki, Michaelides and Nikolov (2008) ; Li and Yao (2007) ; Rios-Rull and Sanchez-Marcos (2008) motive for owning (as in Diaz and Luengo-Prado (2008) ; Gervais (2002) ). Other, more "fundamental" frictions used in models include a user cost premium of renting over owning, perhaps due to excessive utilization of housing services on the part of renters (as in Henderson and Ioannides (1983) ), amplifications to the perceived volatility of rents (Berkovec and Fullerton (1992) ), a housing ladder with only owner-occupied housing on the top rungs (Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2006); Rios-Rull and Sanchez-Marcos (2007) ), and a warm glow to owning (Iacoviello and Pavan (2009) ; Kiyotaki et al. (2008) ). 2 While "intuitive", it is not yet clear what the size and ultimate source of these various frictions are. Most, like differential housing supply and warm glows, are likely equilibrium outcomes rather than inputs.
Since owning and renting are just labels for different (perhaps many different) contracts to provide housing services, we model the homeownership decision and the availability of rental housing as an outcome of a contracting problem and a search problem. In the baseline model, houses are ex-ante identical and households differ only according to their cost of owning and their expected duration of stay in a house, which may be private information 3 . Homeowners (which may be households or landlords) post contracts for housing services which specify a (potentially typedependent) price for housing services as well as whether, after eventual separation, the current owner or the future occupant is responsible for finding the next tenant (a "rental" or "owning" contract, respectively).
Within the housing market in this economy, households can direct their search to a specific type of contract (so that each type of contract is its own submarket) and are bilaterally matched to houses within that submarket subject to the frictions from competitive search theory (Moen (1997) and Shimer (1996) ). In equilibrium, vacancies in a particular submarket adjust so that the expected return to adding a new house in any submarket is the same.
Our main results are twofold. First, an incentive problem in rental markets distorts market tightnesses 4 compared to the public information benchmark. In the economy where households' expected durations are public information, households with low vacancy hazard rates (long-duration households) pay lower rental rates and search in less tight markets than households with high hazard rates. However, when expected durations are private information, long-duration households search in tighter markets than short-duration households, thus they spend more time on average 2 One class of frictions that may work both ways is risk in the housing market, as in Sinai and Souleles (2005) . 3 There is a long literature looking at mobility and homeownership choices. Deng, Gabriel and Nothaft (2003) and Gabriel and Nothaft (2001) find considerable variation across households and Metropolitan Statistical Areas in rental vacancy rates and durations. Boehm, Herzog Jr. and Schlottmann (1991) , Cameron and Tracy (1997), Haurin and Gill (2002) and Kan (2000) all find relationships between mobility hazards and homeownership.
4 Markets are less tight if households on average take less time to find a house, or equivalently if landlords take longer on average to fill a vacancy.
searching for a house (per separation spell), but pay even lower rental rates once matched. (The unique equilibrium is separating.) The intuition for the result is that in equilibrium housing is under-provided to long-duration households so as to discourage short-duration households from searching there. In this sense, private information causes housing scarcity in some rental markets.
The data are consistent with the presence of an information problem. Under public information, submarkets with higher surplus matches (due to the high expected duration of the matches) should have lower queues for rental housing and lower rents. Instead the data show that while rents are lower, queues are higher in high surplus submarkets. To our knowledge, this is the first data on rental vacancies capable of affording a within market analysis of the variation in (sub)market tightnesses.
In our economy, owning a house solves the private information problem by internalizing the separation hazard in the optimal search problem of the household, but at some heterogenous cost.
Our second result is that households that expect to stay in their house long enough are more likely to choose to own rather than rent. The distortions implied by the incentive problem in the rental market pile-up: the deviations from first-best due to private information (compared to the public information benchmark) are larger in markets where the long-duration households search.
Meanwhile the owning contract is always incentive compatible. If a household has a high enough expected duration, the distortions in the rental market due to the information problem dominate her cost of owning so that she prefers to own the house even though owning would otherwise be less efficient (in a first-best sense). This too is consistent with the correlations we find in the data.
A policy of rent control predictably leads to a lower supply of rental housing and tighter markets in the regulated market in both public and private information cases. With private information however, the effects on the regulated market spill into the unregulated market, leading to lower supply and tighter markets there as well. This happens even though there is no excess demand in any market (as in e.g. Fallis and Smith (1984) ); all markets are in equilibrium. Instead, by worsening the allocation for low-duration households, rent control exacerbates the information problem, making it more costly for higher-duration households to screen the low-duration households.
In the final part of our paper, we give the economy access to a technology which permits the building of non-conforming, i.e. customized, houses; which we model as giving a higher utility flow at some cost to the matching probability. We show that customization appeals most to longduration households. So, unlike rent control, the customization technology offers an additional way to relax the incentive compatibility constraints in the rental market; thus there may be "overcustomization" in the rental market relative to the public information benchmark. And yet, since the appeals of owning and customization are each increasing in expected duration, more owners than renters may customize. If customization is observable to an econometrician using hedonics, than owner-occupiers will appear to live in houses with more amenities, otherwise they will appear to get a warm glow from owning (that is, they would appear to get a higher utility flow from the same observable set of house attributes).
We are following a growing literature by looking at housing in a search or matching framework (e.g. Albrecht, Anderson, Smith and Vroman (2007) ; Albrecht, Gautier and Vroman (2010); Caplin and Leahy (2008) ; Ngai and Tenreyro (2009); Piazzesi and Schneider (2009); Wheaton (1990) ). To our knowledge, we are the first to look at both renting and owning in such a framework and the first to look jointly at renting and owning with adverse selection 5 . Our work looks at contracts to supply housing services 6 when there are search frictions and asymmetric information and thus extends the work of Guerrieri, Shimer and Wright (2010) to include dynamic contracts in a competitive search equilibrium with adverse selection 7 . In our equilibrium, contracts can be dynamic while the markets themselves are in steady-state. Concurrently and complementarily, Chang (2011) and Guerrieri and Shimer (2012) examine environments where the markets can change dynamically, however all contracts are one-time exchanges (purchases and sales of assets).
Variations in households' marginal rates of substitution across submarkets could potentially explain this correlation (as in Sinai and Souleles (2005) ) but only if the marginal rates of transformation between rental and owner-occupied housing varied similarly across submarkets. In our paper, price-to-rent ratios vary even though the marginal rates of transformation are constant.
Our work on customization is a sort of companion to House and Ozdenoren (2008) . In their model of durable goods, goods that are more durable are endogenously more homogeneous due to resale concerns. They cite "McMansions" (which are predominately owner-occupied) as an example of a generic durable good. In our model, durable goods are endogenously heterogeneous or homogeneous based on the expected duration of the match (rather than the duration of the good).
The typical owner-occupied house is actually relatively varied compared to rental housing in our economy since, endogenously, owner-occupiers expect to be matched longer with their house.
The remainder of this paper is as follows: Section 2 examines market tightnesses and prices in rental and owner-occupied markets using data from Craigslist; Section 3 presents economies of renting with public and then private information; Section 4 presents the owning technology and the 5 Hubert (1995); Miceli and Sirmans (1999) have models with renters and adverse selection in which long-term tenants have declining rent schedules while Barker (2003) shows that if households have inelastic demand for housing, those that expect to stay longer do not usually get discounts on their rent. Brueckner (1994) presents a model with adverse selection and evidence that banks use menus of mortgage points and interest rates to obtain information on a household's expected mobility. 6 and in this sense compliments the work on optimal mortgage design in owner-occupied markets (contracts for loans backed by housing services) by Tchistyi (2011, 2010) 7 Delacroix and Shi (2007) and Albrecht et al. (2010) have adverse selection problems where the side posting the price has full information. Here, as in Guerrieri et al. (2010) , the side directing its search has the superior information.
equilibrium with owning and renting; Section 5 presents a numerical example and the effects of rent control while section 6 presents the customization technology. Section 7 concludes by commenting briefly on how our economy here could be extended to include optimal rental contracts. Most proofs are in the Appendix.
Rental Markets in the data
We merge data from the 2000 and 2010 U.S. Census and 2011 American Community Survey (ACS) with a novel data set constructed from rental and for-sale advertisements posted on Craistlist.org. Using our matched data, we construct a measure of how long each home is on the market, T i , by using the time span in days between its first and last postings plus three days.
The additional days are used so that homes only listed once are still "on the market" for some time period. Our results are robust to changes in this length of time. The average number of days between postings for the same home in our rental data is 6 days and 8 days in the for-sale market.
Our notion of a submarket is all housing for rent (or sale) within a zip code with the same number of bedrooms. For measures of rent-to-price ratios, we create rental and sale price indices for each zip code by number of bedroom cell by taking the mean rental or sale price for that cell 8 The data also contain the URL of the posting and sometimes contain additional information such as the number of bathrooms, whether the residence is a single-family home, and some contact information for the listing agent. 9 Our results are robust to changes in these numbers.
and then taking the ratio of those means as the rent-to-price ratio for that cell. City. So we treat all rentals located in a common three digit zip with the same number of bedrooms as being in the same market. A submarket within this market is then a particular zip code and number of bedrooms.
We are interested in variation within a market at the "submarket" level. In the model that follows, households choose a submarket from within a market to direct their search to. Our theory connects households' expected duration in a home with the submarkets they choose to search and live in and with rental rates and the availability of rental homes. Expected duration is treated as exogenous, but location choice (and therefore the average expected duration in a location), price and availability are all endogenous outcomes. Given that, the regression results presented below should be thought of as evidence of correlations between market outcomes and not anything causal and the standard errors taken with a grain of salt.
There are several other caveats worth mentioning. The Craigslist listings are not random selections from their various markets, particularly in the for sale markets. Our partitioning of markets and submarkets is somewhat arbitrary and we do not account for spatially correlated errors beyond clustering the standard errors at the zip level. Omitted variables are likely a huge problem.
We use two different proxies for average expected duration: the proportion of households under 35 years old living in the area, and the average time since last move for renters 10 . Age is positively correlated with expected duration (since uncertainty over income and family prospects falls with age, see Halket and Vasudev (2013) ), so the proportion under 35 will be negatively correlated with expected duration. Meanwhile (ex-post) actual duration is almost certainly positively correlated with (ex-ante) expected duration. We include median income in the zip in our regressions as unobserved quality and thus rents and prices is likely correlated with income. Of course, neither age nor perhaps realized duration is orthogonal to income. Furthermore expected duration is correlated with tenure decisions due to the high transactions costs of home ownership. So the 10 The 2000 Census gives the number of renters that have moved into their current home in the last year, between tenure rate results below should be taken with an additional grain of salt. Table 1 shows that, in our data, both rental and sale prices are lowest in the submarkets where (respectively) rental and sale time on markets are lowest; a relationship which will follow naturally from the free entry conditions in our model. For instance, in rental markets, landlords must be compensated with higher rents when renting in markets where houses stay vacant for longer. Table   1 also shows that households with lower expected durations search in submarkets with higher rental prices but lower sales prices. Unsurprisingly then, rent-to-price ratios in the submarkets where these households search tend to be higher. Despite the fact that rentals are expensive relative to prices, though, homeownership rates tend to be lower in these same submarkets (Table 2) .
From Table 2 , households with lower expected durations search in rental markets where time on the market is longer, while time on the for-sale market is hardly different. As we will show below, a negative correlation between expected duration and time on the market is not consistent with a competitive search equilibrium with public information. Searching for a new tenant is costly, so more surplus is created when a landlord is matched with a high expected duration tenant. In equilibrium, absent other frictions, this extra surplus should be allocated towards some combination of lower rents and more houses, decreasing both the cost of housing and search costs for households.
That is, absent other frictions, long duration households should find housing faster and landlords should take longer to match with long duration households. Instead, the data show that landlords match quickly with long duration households. In what follows, we will argue that this is evidence for an extra private information friction.
Rental market

Preferences and technology
Time is continuous and the horizon is infinite. There is a measure one of households indexed by their type i ∈ I = {1, 2, .., I} and a large set of landlords or builders. Let π i be the fraction of households of type i in the population, for all i. If a landlord decides to participate in the market, she pays a cost H in units of utility to build a house but then houses are costless to maintain; if she doesn't participate, she gets a payoff equal to 0. Households receive a flow utility of h when they occupy a house and 0 when they do not. Households and landlords each discount at the same rate ρ < 1. We assume h > ρH.
Households that are currently occupying a house separate with it at a hazard rate γ : I → Γ ⊂ R + , at which point a separated household no longer receives any utility from living in that particular house. Without loss of generality, we assume that γ is strictly decreasing. We will often refer to a household of type i as having a hazard
We will also derive some analytical and computational results for the special case
is dense in Γ. We refer to this special case as the differential-γ case. A rental contract w ∈ W specifies a flow rent, possibly contingent on type, paid by the household to the landlord if matched. The contract ends in the case of separation. We will restrict our attention to rental contracts with a fixed flow rent. Barker (2003) finds that most rental contracts do not have a duration-of-stay discount. Our model would yield similar qualitative features but would be far more complicated if we also imposed limited commitment constraints on both the household and landlord and a preference for smooth payments (perhaps due to borrowing constraints). In section 7, we offer some discussion of fully dynamic contracts.
We consider two cases. In the first, a household's type is publicly observable and so contracts are also free to have type-specific rents. However, we will show that in equilibrium, only one type is lured by each contract. In the second case, a household's type is private information. In this case, by the revelation principle, we assume that landlords post a contract which contains direct revelation mechanisms for each type, without loss of generality. Following Guerrieri et al. (2010) , we will show that we can assume without loss of generality that landlords post contracts with typeindependent mechanisms. More precisely, in the private information case the equilibrium with contracts is payoff equivalent to the equilibrium with degenerate mechanisms, offering the same rent to each household. This will eventually simplify the notation greatly.
The matching process between households and landlords is frictional. At any given time landlords post a single contract at zero cost and households direct their search to the most attractive contracts. 11
Associated with any contract w, let u be the measure of households directing their search to w and v be the measure of landlords posting w. Define θ = u/v as the market tightness associated with contract w, θ : W → R + . Households find a house at rate α h (θ) where α h : R + → R + and α h is decreasing in θ. Landlords fill a vacancy at rate α l (θ), where α l : R + → R + is increasing in θ. We assume that α l (θ) = θα h (θ), that is equivalent to constant returns to scale in matching, and α h (0) = α l (∞) = ∞ and α h (∞) = α l (0) = 0. We assume that the elasticity of α l (θ),
Let ψ i (w) be the share of households of type i applying to any given contract w, so that
The market tightness θ(w) and the share of households applying to w, ψ(w) are determined in equilibrium.
Let V r (γ i , r, θ) and Z r (γ i , r, θ) be the expected values of living in a house and searching for a 11 Matching is bilateral, thus every household can only apply to one contract, but she can use mixed strategies.
house 12 , respectively, to the households of type i applying to any given contract, w with rental payment for that type of r. θ = θ(w) is the market tightness associated with the contract w. Then: r, θ) and X r (w, θ) be the expected values of an occupied house when matched with a type i and a vacant house, respectively, to the landlord:
where ψ i (w) is the share of households of type i applying to the contract w, specifying rent r i for that type, and θ is the market tightness associated with that contract.
Solving for the flow value of searching ρZ r (γ i , r, θ) and posting ρX r (w) gives:
Notice that ρZ r (γ i , r, θ) < 0 if r > h, ∀i and ∀θ > 0, thus no household would apply to a contract that imposes a flow rent r higher than the flow utility from housing h. Similarly, X r (w, θ) < H if r i < ρH for all i for which ψ i (w)θ > 0.
Equilibrium with public information
A competitive search equilibrium satisfies the following conditions in every submarket: (i) landlords maximize expected profits; (ii) free entry (new entrants earn zero profits in expectation); (iii) households direct their search to the most convenient posted vacancy; (iv) θ = θ(w) is consistent with rational expectations in equilibrium but also for any possible deviation w ′ .
More precisely, a landlord offering w ′ ̸ = w expects that households apply until the market tightness θ ′ implies an expected value for the household equal to the outside option Z r , that is taken as given by the (atomistic) firm. Formally:
12 These are the values of searching and living in the same market, repeatedly ad infinitum. 
(ii) Households' optimal search:
The equilibrium definition imposes restrictions on the off-equilibrium beliefs of the landlords.
The optimal search value of any type-i household is defined over the set of contracts posted in equilibrium W * r only, but under any deviating contract w ′ / ∈ W * r , landlords expect market tightness θ * r (w ′ ) to adjust to make all types of households weakly worse off. We can distinguish competitive equilibria according to whether there are contracts which attract more than one type in equilibrium. Proof. See Appendix.
In separating competitive equilibria, the market endogenously segments into submarkets, one for any different type i of households. Thus without loss of generality we can assume that a contract w in a separating competitive equilibrium contains a menu of rents where there is only one rent r i < h and thereafter label w = r i . This also pins down the measure of landlords posting the contract w to households of type i, given by v(w) =
Characterization
A necessary and sufficient condition for a separating competitive search equilibrium is the follow- 
The equilibrium allocation maximizes the expected value of search of any type-i household conditional on the firms making non-negative profits.
Proposition 2. A solution to R i exists for each i. The solution is unique.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 2. In the solution to
Proof. Using the constraint with equality to substitute for w * i r , the first order condition implies the following equilibrium condition for the market tightness:
The implicit solution for θ * i r is strictly increasing in γ i .
13 See e.g. Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) for a proof, with one caveat to the proof of sufficiency: in our setting, even if mechanisms in W * r are separating, other mechanisms in W I can be pooling. It is straightforward to use the argument in the proof of Lemma 1 to show that if the sufficiency conditions are met for a separating competitive search equilibrium with separating-only mechanisms then they will be met here too.
Lemma 3. Any competitive equilibrium with public information is a separating competitive equilibrium.
Proof. Follows immediately from Lemmas 1 and 2 and Proposition 1.
The equilibrium values of the flow rent w * i r and the household's expected value ρZ * i r are given by:
We have the following comparative static results as γ i varies:
Result 1. In equilibrium, as the separation hazard γ i increases:
(i) the market tightness θ * i r increases;
(ii) the flow rent w * i r increases;
(iii) the expected value to households Z * i r decreases.
Thus, households with lower expected durations have lower surplus from matching with a house and thus face tighter markets and higher rents once matched and as a consequence have lower search values.
Analytically, for the differential-γ case, by differentiating 14 the equilibrium condition (3) we obtain:
14 We need to explicitly define our notion of differentiation. Let f :
where q, q ′ ∈ range(f ). The total derivative is defined analogously.
Renting with private information
The equilibrium allocation in the public information case implies that every type j < I strictly prefers to search in a higher (i > j) type's market if she was offered the higher type's contracted rent. In this section, we assume that the type of the household, i, is known only by the household.
So, the public information allocation will not be incentive compatible under private information.
A mechanism in this setting would be a set of rents {r} i∈I . However, from the households value of being matched, it is clear that the only mechanism compatible with truth telling offers the same rent to any reported type. 
Proof. Follows from equation 1.
The sorting lemma is sufficient to have a separating equilibrium and differs from the (assumed) condition in Guerrieri et al. (2010) in that it involves local perturbations in both the contract w and the market tightness θ. We define the equilibrium following and extending the definition in Guerrieri et al. (2010) to a dynamic setting. 
(ii) households' optimal search: Let
with equality if θ * p (w) > 0 and ψ i (w) > 0.
As in the public information case, the equilibrium definition imposes conditions on the offequilibrium beliefs of the landlords. Heuristically, a landlord considering whether to post a deviating contract w ′ imagines an initial market tightness θ = 0. If no household is willing to apply, then θ = 0 and the deviation is not profitable. Otherwise, some households apply, increasing market tightness θ, until only one type of household i is indifferent about the deviating w ′ and all others j (weakly) prefer their equilibrium contracts. This in turn pins down the share ψ i of households applying to that contract.
Equilibrium and Characterization
The characterization of the equilibrium with private information is equivalent to the public information equilibrium with an extra incentive compatibility constraint that imposes that no other types of households j are attracted to the contract w i . In the next proposition, we show that at the optimum, for all i > 1, only the marginal incentive compatibility constraints IC(i − 1, i) bind:
every type (i − 1) is indifferent between his own contract and the contract offered to the type i with marginally higher expected duration.
Proposition 3. Let the problem (P R) be defined by the following constrained maximization problem
(P R i ), for any i ∈ I:
where w * i p , θ * i p is an optimal solution for i.
The solution of (P R) exists and is unique. Moreover, only the marginal incentive compatibility constraints IC(i − 1, i) bind, for all i > 1:
) and
Thus, for the type with the highest separation hazard, γ 1 =γ, the equilibrium allocation is the same as the one with public information. Then, the problem is solved iteratively for all other types: 
We are now ready to prove the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium and characterize the equilibrium allocation: 
Analytically, for the differential-γ case, then:
Contrary to the public information case, low-γ types search in tighter markets in equilibrium, and pay lower rents if matched. In this way landlords are able to optimally (with the least cost) separate types of households by posting contracts w * i p lower than the first-best optimum w * i r to those that expect to stay longer, in return for a higher market tightness θ * i p . Households that expect to stay longer are less affected by a higher market tightness (and thus longer expected search times), because they expect to separate from the house and "pay" the search cost less frequently. On the other hand, those that expect to stay longer are more affected by a lower rent w because they expect to be matched a higher fraction of time for any given market tightness θ. The combination of these two factors implies that the second best allocation dictates tighter markets for those that expect to stay longer, contrary to the first best allocation. These tighter markets imply a lower vacancy rate (defined as vacancies per unit of housing).
Owning market
An owning contract simply specifies an up-front payment P paid by the household to the seller, which may vary across submarkets. Households derive the same flow utility h if they own or rent the house, and landlords (i.e. builders) pay the same building cost H.
As will become clear below, absent some further friction, owning would efficiently solve the private information problem and all markets would be owner-occupied markets 15 . To provide heterogeneity, we assume that there is an extra friction in the owning market which is heterogenous in the population 16 . We assume that each household draws a "friction" χ ∈ [χ, χ] ⊂ R + from a probability distribution F , which is a fixed effect for the household. For simplicity, we assume that χ is independent of type i and that the friction additively affects the value of searching and living 15 The i = 1 type would be indifferent between owning and renting. 16 There are plenty of potential candidate frictions. For instance, a (possibly heterogeneous) "financing cost" or additional transactions costs. See Halket and Pignatti (2012) for an example where the extra cost in the owning market is sequential search. in a house. Independence could be easily relaxed while additivity means that there will be a single owning submarket for each type i, which eases notation.
Builders only have to sell a new house. It is important to notice that the owning market is not affected by the private information friction, because a household that buys the house, an owner, fully internalizes the expected search cost eventually paid in the case of separation, contrary to a renter. The builder's expected value of posting in an owning market with tightness θ a contract for sale at price P is simply given by:
Notice that 4 is independent of γ i . In equilibrium X o (P, θ) = H for any owning submarket with positive ownership rates. This immediately implies that sale prices are negative correlated with market tightnesses.
The values of searching as a buyer and living in a market with market tightness θ and price P for a household of type i and cost χ, respectively, are given by:
Solving for the flow value of searching as a buyer gives:
Equilibrium with only owning
Conditional on market tightnesses, neither builders nor owners when selling care about the types of the buyers in the market in which they have posted. So owning markets do not depend on whether households' types are public or private information. The equilibrium definition of an economy with only owning markets is similar to the equilibrium in economy with only rental markets with private information in that contracts (prices) are not type-specific: each submarket offers just one contract price (see Appendix for definition). The market endogenously segments into submarkets and we can characterize the equilibrium allocation using an equivalent constrained maximization problem.
As in the economies with renting, the equilibrium in the owning economy can be found by solving a constrained optimization problem iteratively by type. 17 The optimal market tightness conditional on owning for each type, θ * i o , is the same as the optimal tightness for the public renting market θ * i r .
Equilibrium with both renting and owning
We are now ready to study the equilibrium problem in the housing market with private information.
Landlords/builders are free to enter in both the rental and the owning market. If they enter, they pay a building cost H and post a contract in one submarket. Households have private information over their mobility hazard rate γ and direct their search to their preferred postings.
In the appendix, we formally define a competitive equilibrium with private information and both renting and owning. The equilibrium with both renting and owning can be characterized by the iterative solutions to a problem analogous to those with only owning or renting 18 :
Result 3. The proportion of type i that are homeowners is increasing in i
The equilibrium in the private information rental market for the highest-γ type is the same as in the public information case while the maximands to the owning part of the characterization are identical to the solutions for the owning-only economy. For households with lower γ's, the equilibrium in the (private information) rental market is increasingly distorted with respect to the first best (public information) equilibrium. This immediately implies that the type-specific cutoff
is increasing in i.
Example and application to rent control
As a parametrization, we set ρ = .05, h = .1, H = 1, α l = θ ε with ε = .5, and we allow for γ ∈ [.2, .7] , that is expected durations between 1.4 and 5 years, approximately and χ is distributed uniformly Figure 3 plots the market tightness, or queue length, and the homeownership rate and figure 4 the flow rent (or housing price) as a function of γ in the three economies: renting with public information, renting with private information and owning. 18 We omit the proof, however it is similar to the case with only renting
The queue length increases as γ increases in the case of renting with public information and in the owning economy (and it is shorter in the latter case), while it decreases as γ increases in the renting economy with private information. In both renting economies, the flow rent increases with γ: it increases faster in the private information case to offset the positive effect of the longer queue length faced by low γ-types on landlords' profits. The housing price in the owning economy markets, expressed in flow terms (ρP ), decreases slightly as γ increases; prices are lower in markets where houses sell quickly, as follows from free entry condition for the owning market.
Finally, figure 5 shows the expected value of searching for a house as a function of γ when renting with public information and renting with private information. The value of renting with public information is always higher than the other cases (and it coincides with the private information renting for the highest value of γ). The expected value increases as γ decreases in both markets but it increases less in the private information renting market.
As we know from the theoretical results above, for any parametrization, the model gives the same qualitative patterns that we have found in the data:
• Scarce rentals and low time on the market in submarkets with lower rents.
• Households with high expected durations search in rental markets with scarce housing and lower rents if they search for rental housing.
• Households with high expected durations search in for-sale markets with higher prices if they search for owner-occupied housing.
• Areas with high ownership rates also have low rent-to-price ratios.
Quantitatively, if we equate expected duration in the model with the average observed duration in the data, the model could generate a similar elasticity of time on the rental market with respect to expected duration by setting ε = .1.
Rent control
We continue the example by analyzing the same economy but with the addition of a very stylized rent control policy. Here rent control is just a simple rent ceiling (which we set to 90 percent of the highest rent in the uncontrolled economy). Figures 6, 7 and 8 show, respectively, the queue length, rents and expected value of searching in the controlled economy.
In the case of public information, the rent control policy distorts the markets for the shortestduration households the most; their queues lengthen considerably and the supply of regulated rental housing falls, increasing the ownership rate only for those types whose rental submarkets have rents at the ceiling rate. All rental markets that had rents above the ceiling in the uncontrolled economy now have rents at the ceiling rate. However, because markets segment perfectly with public information, rent control does not affect the uncontrolled rental markets that already had low rents.
With private information, all rental markets are affected by the ceiling even though only the low-duration households have rents at the ceiling rate. That the controlled market affects the uncontrolled markets is not due to some households leaving the controlled market for an uncontrolled one, as in e.g. Fallis and Smith (1984) (where there is excess demand in the controlled market) and Weibull (1983) (where there is no excess demand) nor to misallocation of high-quality housing (as hinted at in Glaeser and Luttmer (2003) and examined more broadly for the case of China by Wang (2011) ). Here, there is no excess demand; the controlled market is in "equilibrium", albeit an inefficient one 19 . Instead, rent control exacerbates the private information problem by making the low-duration households worse-off in their own market, tightening the incentive compatibility constraint. Queues in all rental markets are higher and the supply of rental housing is everywhere lower. The lower expected value of searching in the rental market also leads to more ownership, which, unlike in the case of public information, occurs with any binding rent ceiling.
Obviously rent control is not a welfare-improving policy in our economy. In fact, the Pareto optimal policy would be a system of market dependent lump-sum taxes and transfers to households that effectively shares the surplus that the longer-duration households have over the shorter-duration ones in the public information economy 20 . Rather than focusing on these policies though, we instead next endow the economy with a customization technology which in equilibrium helps screen low-duration types.
Customization
As we have seen, the private information problem can be decentralized in a rather easy way: some houses are for sale while other houses are for rent. It is "easy" for a household to direct its search in this case. In this section, we relax the assumption that all houses offer the same utility flow to all households and that this utility flow is observable prior to a match. There are generally many attributes, like specific location, the quality of the light in the house and so forth, that are 19 There is no excess demand or supply at the controlled rent, and in that sense the controlled market is in equilibrium (as in Weibull (1983)). However landlords would enter into the market offering a higher rent and lower implied market tightness, if they could. Therefore neither the public nor private information controlled market allocations are competitive equilibriums as defined above. Rather they are competitive equilibriums to economies with the added restriction that w ∈ [ρH,w] I , wherew is the rent ceiling. 20 This optimum can potentially replicate the first best queues and rents if the masses of long-duration households are large enough.
often only observable in person. Tastes for these particular attributes can vary -some households value a quiet residential street more than others. To capture some of this, we add a customization technology similar to ones used in random-search models of housing (e.g. Arnott (1989); Igarashi (1991) ). We assume that customization raises the flow utility that a household gets from the house at a cost of reduced matching. , where δ > 1, and receives a flow of 0 otherwise. 21 Tastes are distributed uniformly over the population and independently of type i. We assume that a contract can specify whether or not a house has been customized but not the variety of customization. The variety of a particular house is not known to a prospective renter or owner until after the household is matched with the house. At this point the household observes the variety of the house and can then reject the match (and thus the contract) and continue to search.
Lastly, we assume that when houses are built, the builders know the measure of customized houses in the economy but do not observe the distribution of existing varieties. Thus builders pursue symmetric mixed strategies with regards to variety choice and the resulting distribution of varieties is uniform.
Our assumptions mean that: i) if a household chooses to search in a customized market, it will optimally choose to search there until it is matched with a house for which it is well-matched (i.e. gets h + c utility flow from); ii) acceptable matches in a customized market with a mass of u searchers and a mass v postings will occur at a rate m c (u, v) = m(u, v)/δ. 
Customization in rental markets
The flow value of searching in a customized rental market for a given γ i , w and market tightness θ is given by ρZ c (γ i , w, θ) (and likewise the flow value of vacancy is ρX c (γ i , w, θ) ). 22
With public information, for any market that customizes, the equilibrium conditions for market tightness, rents and search value for each type (θ * i cr , w * i cr , Z * i cr , respectively) are
Note that δ influences the flow value only through the equilibrium queue length.
The overall equilibrium value of search for a household with public information renting only but with the choice of customization is then the upper envelope of Z * i cr and Z * i r . Finally, customization with public information is a normal good in the sense that if any type prefers their customized market to their (shadow) uncustomized one, then all types with longer expected durations will also prefer their respective customized markets:
Result 4. If there exists anĩ such that
Customization in the owning market
The analysis of the owning market with customization is similar to the case without customization.
For any type i, price P and market tightness θ:
The market tightness in a given market is determined from the builders' zero profit condition:
Customization with private information
The problem of customization when information is private follows similarly. We skip the definition of a competitive equilibrium and turn immediately to how to solve for its unique allocation. 
We analyze numerically some properties of the equilibrium in the following example.
Example continued
We continue the above example (without rent control) by adding δ = 1.35 and c = .01. Figure 9 shows the value of searching in each rental market with private info, ρZ * cp , ρZ * up . There is a kink in ρZ * cp and the customized queue length path; the incentive compatibility constraint does not bind in customized market for the lowest types and thus queue lengths can fall as γ decreases for as long as the constraint doesn't bind (as in figure 10 ). However, these markets are non-existent in equilibrium as the values of searching in the customized markets are dominated by the uncustomized markets' values for these types.
For higher types the values of search in the uncustomized and customized markets are nearly the same (although the customized market is slightly better): for any type, slightly worse types are searching in their own customized markets where their search value is higher than it otherwise would be if there were only uncustomized markets. This relaxes the incentive compatibility constraint in the uncustomized market (relative to the case with only that market) nearly to the value of the customized market's one. However, the value of search in the uncustomized market is still slightly below because it is still harder to properly incentivize lower types in an uncustomized market and so distortions using the queue length are larger. First, private information leads to "over-customization" in the rental market: some markets are customized with private information where the types' corresponding market with public information would not customize. As in the simpler economy without customization but with private information, the market uses longer search times to screen away shorter duration households from the long duration households' markets. In the economy with the customization technology, there are two ways to lengthen search times: lengthen queues and customizing. So customization has two benefits with private information (higher flow utility and better screening) which leads it to be adopted for types that would not have adopted it under public information.
The cutoff γ such that owner-occupiers prefer customized houses is the same as the cutoff γ for renting with public information. This cutoff is lower than the cutoff in the renting market with private information. However ownership rates are higher for low γ types, so the proportion of customized houses in the owner-occupied markets may be higher than same proportion on the rental market. In this case the average homeowner gets a higher flow utility from living in his house (h + c) than does the average renter and pays a higher price. An econometrician who did observe this customization would think that homeowners get a warm glow from owning.
Conclusion
We build a competitive search equilibrium model of housing tenure choices where households have private information over their expected duration, and we study the properties of rental and owning markets in a search equilibrium. Owning a house solves the private information problem but at some heterogeneous cost. We show that both renting and owning markets endogenously segment into submarkets, one for every type of households.
In the rental markets, households that expect to stay longer search in thinner markets in order to discourage more footloose households from searching in the same market. Relative to the firstbest, the distortions in the rental market with private information increase with expected duration.
As a result, more of the households that expect to stay longest in their houses will choose to own.
Our novel data on rental markets corroborate the model. Submarkets with high duration households have higher price-to-rent ratios, higher ownership rates and tighter rental markets.
Rent control leads to distortions in both controlled and uncontrolled markets by exacerbating incentive compatibility constraints when information is private. A customization technology that raises the utility from housing at the cost of a lower probability of a match can help screen lowduration types. The extra screening leads to over-customization in the private information rental markets relative to the public information benchmark. However, since the appeal of customization is higher for households that expect to stay in their house longer, owner-occupiers may tend to customize more.
Though the rental contracts considered here are limited to constant, duration-independent rents, it would be relatively straightforward to consider duration-dependent contracts (and thus fully optimal) subject to additional limited participation constraints that, absent a separation shock, neither the landlord nor the household's continuation values in the contract fall below their outside options of search. Optimal duration-dependent contracts could achieve the first best as long as households remain risk-neutral. If households were risk-neutral, the optimal rent contract with private information would feature an upfront payment to the landlord followed by a constant rent w = ρH. However, Barker (2003) finds little evidence for declining rent schedules. If households are risk-averse, we suggest (without proving) that the equilibrium contracts offered in such an economy may otherwise have many of the same qualitative features as those presented above.
Other scopes for extension include using a life-cycle model to unify expected durations and the costs of owning using perhaps a borrowing constraint. As long as any mooted cost of owning does not increase too quickly with expected duration, those with the highest expected durations will choose to own. 
Appendix
(ii) Households' optimal search: 
with equality if w ∈W * p .
(ii) Builders' profit maximization and free entry: for any
(iii) Households' optimal search: Let
and Z * i
(iv) market clearing:
Proofs not in the main text
Proof of Lemma 1
Let w be any contract in any pooling equilibrium for which there exists i ̸ = j and ψ i (w) > 0, ψ j (w) > 0. The landlord takes the expected values ρZ r (γ i , r i , θ(w)) and ρZ r (γ j , r j , θ(w)) of the two types as given.
A landlord cannot make strictly lower expected profits from either type. If she could, then a deviating contract would be the menu that does not offer an attractive rent to that type. By rational expectations, the expected queue length must be the same and so the landlord will make strictly higher expected profits, a contradiction. Therefore:
From (6), θ * r is increasing in γ, so from the zero-profit condition for landlords, w * r is increasing in γ. So Z * r is decreasing in γ.
Proof of Proposition 3
We go through the following steps:
The IC(j, i) with j > i, never binds; a type with γ j < γ i never wants to deviate to the i-contract. Any contract and associated market-tightness for a type i is also feasible for any type j > i. 
